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Abstract
Colombia and the United States have had a closed relationship since Twentieth century 
until now. This relationship has consisted of an international cooperation in terms of security, 
economy, justice and the fight against the illegal cultivation, their eradication, and drug trafficking. 
Thus, the objective of the present article is to analyze two of the latest programs which outline 
the bilateral cooperation between Bogotá and Washington: “Plan Colombia” and “Paz Colombia”. 
On the other hand, the challenges and opportunities as a feature in the new era of international 
cooperation for Colombia will be evaluated, taking into account the post-conflict context. Agreeing 
to the considerations above, the new stage will be determined, and a possible wide spectrum of 
international cooperation would start for Colombia.
Keywords: Bilateral cooperation, Plan Colombia, Peace Colombia, challenges, opportunities.
Resumen
Los Estados Unidos y Colombia han tenido una relación cercana desde el siglo veinte hasta la 
actualidad. Esta relación ha consistido en una cooperación internacional en cuanto a seguridad, 
economía, justicia, la lucha contra los cultivos ilícitos, su erradicación, y el narcotráfico. Por esta 
razón, el objetivo central de la presente investigación es analizar los dos principales programas de 
esa relación bilateral, “Plan Colombia” y “Paz Colombia”. Además, se determinaran los desafíos 
y oportunidades en la nueva era de cooperación internacional de Colombia, considerando el 
contexto del pos-conflicto. Por lo anterior, el nuevo escenario será determinado y un posible amplio 
espectro de cooperación internacional podría comenzar para Colombia.
 Palabras clave: Cooperación bilateral, Plan Colombia, Peace Colombia, desafíos, 
oportunidades.
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Introduction
The United States established diplomatic 
relationship with Colombia in 1822 when 
the South American country achieved his 
independence from Spain. Afterward, Colombia 
lived a democratic transition, becoming the 
oldest democracy in Latin America. 
The last distinction captivated the U.S 
Government due to the American tradition in 
terms of republicanism (U.S Department of 
State, 2016). 
In the half of the Twentieth century, 
Colombia experienced a recrudescence of 
violence regarding the internal armed conflict; 
the discrimination of alternative political 
parties and social movements in the political 
system; political persecution towards political 
candidates, political parties and supporters 
or members of political parties, social and 
political movements; murder of presidential 
candidates and state abandonment around all 
the Colombian periphery. (De la Rosa, 2012).
Thus, this stage of violence mutated in the 
direction of the illicit crops, which subsidized 
the groups outside the law and drug cartels in 
80´s decade. 
Countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, 
Guatemala and Mexico that are part of the 
list of countries where drugs are produced, 
marketed and exported to the United States and 
Europe, present geographical and commercial 
conditions that explain the development of 
coca, marijuana and poppy crops, as explained 
by the International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report (2017):
one of the reasons that major drug transit 
or illicit drug producing countries are placed 
on the list is the combination of geographic, 
commercial, and economic factors that allow 
drugs to transit or be produced despite the 
concerned government’s most assiduous en-
forcement measures (p.7).
On the other hand, the report the report 
considers that the region presents some 
challenges regarding the fight against drug 
trafficking and its export to the United States 
and Europe:
The growing expansion of drug trafficking 
in Central America poses serious challenges 
to the region’s limited capability to combat 
both the narcotics trade and organized cri-
me. We are particularly concerned about the 
increasing presence of drug trafficking orga-
nizations in Central America that are fleeing 
more robust counternarcotics regimes el-
sewhere, especially in Mexico and Colombia. 
Often unimpeded, traffickers easily use long 
Central American coastlines for illegal mariti-
me drug shipments. Even though there have 
been noteworthy seizures, a high proportion 
of drugs transiting Central America are not 
detected or seized (p. 8).
For that reason, the United States since 
90´s decade has increased the aids in Latin 
America, especially in Colombia to confront 
the illicit cultivation, as well as to stop the drug 
trafficking that has become into a public health 
through all the American population. 
 According to Rojas (2017), the US aids in 
Colombia were divided in:
First, the judicial cooperation: an extradition 
Treaty between Colombia and the United 
States of America.1 Currently, both agree that 
1 Signed in 1979. It is not applicable internally. The ap-
proving Laws 27 of 1980 and 68 of 1986 were declared 
unenforceable. The Council of State by order of March 23, 
1988, estimated that the 1979 extradition treaty is in force 
internationally but cannot be applied internally for lack of 
parliamentary approval (Ministerio de Justicia y del Dere-
cho, 2018)
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“the extradition treaty is maintained” and the 
Supremacy Court of Colombia “has jurisdiction 
over the extradition process”. 
Second, bilateral economic relation: in 
terms of improving the investment environment, 
the agreement eliminates tariffs and other 
barriers to U.S. exports; expand the trade, and 
promote economic growth in both countries. On 
the other hand, the US investment in Colombia 
was primarily concentrated in the mining and 
manufacturing fields.
Third, assistance relation: U.S. programs 
provided support for the implementation 
of Colombian government reforms in land 
restitution; reparations for victims and vulnerable 
populations, including ethnic communities; 
public and private investments, in particular to 
foster a vibrant rural economy; reintegration 
of ex-combatants; promoting respect for 
human rights and the rule of law; protection 
of vulnerable citizens (such as human rights 
and labor activists); addressing global climate 
change and environmental issues in one of the 
most ecologically diverse countries in the world 
(U.S Department of State, 2018). 
Fourth, Military cooperation: the 
modernization program of the Military forces 
incorporated access to technology, weapons, 
intelligence information and advice on the 
ground, by the first military power internationally.
All previous assistant packages and policies 
related to Colombia were included in the “Plan 
Colombia” and then, Peace Colombia”, the two 
most ambitious international policies made by 
United States Government to contribute to the 
new era of Colombia, which started in 1998 
with the peace process carried out by Pastrana 
Administration and continue nowadays with 
Duque Administration.
Now, an accurate question arises as to why it 
is important to study the Colombian plan and its 
evolution to peace Colombia. The key is in the 
context in which this covenant of cooperation 
between both governments is immersed: post-
conflict. 
This context is liable to fragile processes and 
decisions that may affect the future of relations 
between Bogota and Washington, having more 
consequences for Colombia and its process of 
restoration of past wounds.
The above has to do with the decision-
making of the new governments of both 
countries, to restructure what has been agreed, 
returning to policies linked to controversies of 
conflict resolution questioned in general by the 
leading class and Colombian civil society.
For now, the evolution of the agreement 
and its positive and negative aspects will 
be analyzed, to finish expanding the logical 
reasons for the study of this bilateral cooperation 
agreement in times of reconciliation.
I. Plan Colombia and the bilateral 
cooperation
Colombia has lived more than 50 years of 
internal armed conflict and its evolution in terms 
of political and economic field had as a contrast 
the drug and social conflict, which shaped the 
life of the country by the end of the twentieth 
century. 
As a result, the new era of internal fight 
against cartels, guerrilla and paramilitaries, 
induced to consider Colombia as a failed 
state2 in the international scenario (Ramirez, 
2017). For that reason, US aid focused on drug 
trafficking, the main source where these groups 
2 it must be made clear that Colombia was never a 
failed state, but it was an appellative used by the United 
States to enter the fight against drug trafficking and thus 
assert its interests.
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obtained the resources to be able to generate 
violence.
“Plan Colombia” was the name of an 
ambitious program to manage the periphery 
state abandonment that was one of the main 
reasons of internal armed conflict, and second, 
to fight drug cartels, guerrillas, paramilitaries 
and their illicit economies.
“Plan Colombia” pretended that Colombian 
government manage successively a secure 
effective control over its territory, pursuit 
a strengthening  democratic institutions, 
protecting human rights, providing substantial 
social and economic assistance to its 
citizens, and also making local, and national 
governance more transparent, participatory 
and accountable (Guevara, 2015). 
The above was listed in 10 main strategies 
to overcome the intense conflict in Colombia 
(Ramirez, 2017):
1. Economic strategy to support the ability 
of the Colombian state to collect tax 
revenues and allow the country to have a 
viable counterbalancing economic force 
to drug trafficking.
2. A fiscal and financial strategy that 
sought austerity and adjustment through 
agreements with the IMF.
3. Peace strategy against drug trafficking, 
corruption, and the violation of human 
rights.
4. National defense strategy to restructure 
and modernize the armed forces and the 
police.
5. Judicial and human rights strategy to 
overcome impunity and the humanitarian 
crisis.
6. Counter-narcotics strategy to stop the 
flow of drug money to the insurgent and 
other armed organizations.
7. A development strategy that seeks 
to preserve forest areas and end 
the dangerous expansion of illegal 
crops across the Amazon basin and 
Colombia’s vast natural parks of 
immense biodiversity.
8. Social participation strategy to develop 
accountability in local government, 
community involvement in anti-corruption 
efforts, and pressure over illegal armed 
groups to end kidnapping, violence, and 
internal displacement.
9. Human development strategy to 
guarantee more education and health.
10. International oriented strategy to share 
responsibility in the fight against illegal 
drugs.
All the assistance mentioned above, needed 
a public spending from the United States that 
exceeded the 9.600 million of dollars, whereas 
Colombian public spending surpassed the 
131.000 Millions of dollars. 
As a matter of fact, National Planning 
Department of Colombia (DNP in Spanish) 
did a statistic study of the 15 years of public 
spending of both governments, emphasizing in 
the military and economic sphere (DNP, 2016). 
For that reason, Plan Colombia was divided 
Th
e U
nit
ed
 S
ta
te
s i
nt
er
na
tio
na
l a
id
 to
 th
e n
ew
 st
ag
e o
f C
olo
mb
ia:
 
a n
ew
 er
a f
or
 bi
lat
er
al 
an
d i
nt
er
na
tio
na
l c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n
Revista Internacional de Cooperación y Desarrollo Vol. 5 No. 2 | Año 2018 | pág: 262-281
267
into three main phases (DNP, p.1 2016; 
Ministerio de Defensa, 2016):
The first called Plan for peace, prosperity 
and the strengthening of the State (2000-2006), 
focused its efforts on strengthening armed force 
capacities, the mechanisms of interdiction and 
eradication of illicit crops, providing support for 
alternative development of the regions affected 
by the armed conflict, and support the justice 
administration through the implementation of 
the Accusatory Oral Criminal System (DNP, 
2016, page 1).
The second phase, framed in the Strategy 
for Strengthening Democracy and Social 
Development (2007-2009), channeled 
resources in the fight against terrorism and drug 
trafficking, the strengthening of justice and the 
promotion of Human Rights; The opening of the 
markets, the integral social development and 
the integral attention to displaced population 
(Rojas, 2007). 
From this second phase, the Colombian 
Government initiated the process of 
nationalization of military equipment delivered 
within the PC3 framework.
Finally, the third phase called the Strategic 
Development Initiative for Colombia (2010-
2015) continued to support the fight against 
terrorism and drug trafficking, economic and 
social programs for the vulnerable population, 
and democratic governance and respect for 
Human Rights (US Department of State, 2011). 
As a general conclusion of the three phases, 
the public spending of both countries was 
redistributed in the subsequent graphics:
3 Plan Colombia
Now, the DNP study reflects the distribution 
of the PC budget, around the main spheres of 
the conflict.
First, the military sphere was distributed in:
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Thus, in accordance with the graphic N°3, 
on average of 85% of the military budget was 
to cover the fight against the drug trafficking 
and the 15% to cover the external military 
financing (fight against the guerrilla and cartels; 
improvements in logistics, military systems, 
armaments and equipment (DNP, 2016).
Second, the distribution in the social and 
economic sphere of the PC budget: 
According to the previous graphic, the 
substitution of illicit crops was the PC phase 
I main purpose, and in phase II and III, the 
purpose was the social and economic sphere.  
These are the official data that demonstrate 
the positive aspects of PC. But, there are 
external visions of Plan Colombia´s aid which 
are opposite to the official position by both 
governments. 
One of these visions come from Colombian 
society, most affected by internal conflict, illegal 
cultivation, and drug trafficking. 
These voices argue what really happen 
inside war on drugs. It means a tragic situation 
without an end, an incoherent pursuit of a way 
of a resolution against the internal conflict and 
an external public health inside the American 
and European society (Csete. et al, 2016). 
Other external visions derive from authors 
as Bonikiwski and Gheihman whom as a first 
sight discuss the implications of Plan Colombia 
in an international scene, according to their 
specific struggles. 
For example, Colombia is a nation in which 
the legitimization of the use of violence was 
absent in 80´s decade, where the privatization 
of violence (guerrilla, cartels, paramilitaries), 
replaced the official offered by a state. 
In addition, the illegal culture based on 
violence covered the Colombian society, due 
to the concealment of the illegal practices 
by the latter, which received economic and 
social payments in exchange for the silence 
or work opportunities within these criminal 
organizations, becoming Colombia, into a 
narco-state. That change formed a new set of 
nationalisms, altering the bases of a democratic 
State; mixing the political system with illegality, 
and at the same time, civic culture and decent 
work (Bonikowski, Gheihman 2015). 
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An effect of this lack of legitimization and 
new nationalism was the inattentive position 
of the government, unable of preserving the 
institutionalism in conflict zones of the territory 
and leaving these, without governability. 
Non-governmental organizations such 
as Amnesty International (p.1-5, 2000), who 
has been in the loop on the internal conflict 
of Colombia, and in the improvement of “Plan 
Colombia”, presented objections of the bilateral 
project. Thus, these are some considers 
analyzed from the points of the report:
1. Possible escalation of the armed conflict 
and the humanitarian crisis.
2. The paramilitary forces remain under the 
umbrella of the Plan, because of their 
strong presence in the place where the 
Putumayo pilot plan was established.
3. There are very large speculative interests 
on territories with petroleum resources 
that can be exploited thanks to the 
displacement of the population.
4. Plan Colombia does not assume the 
diagnosis about the root of the conflicts 
that the United Nations and other 
organizations have detected in terms 
of the impunity with which the forces 
responsible for violations of rights act.
5. Assuming the mitigating character of the 
included programs of attention to the 
possible displaced by the conflict, the 
plan already assumes in advance a lack 
of visibility of the military actions of the 
plan.
It seems that all the previous objections 
become real because despite of some 
decreasing numbers in terms of illegal troops 
before Havana Agreement, regarding14% of 
reduction of troops capacity (Ministerio de 
Defensa Nacional, 2013) and cultivations, 
regarding 28.9 % (Fundación Ideas para la 
Paz, 2018), people of Colombia still suffering 
violence and poverty, 28% of total population 
(world Bank, 2016).
In addition, in the international scenario, 
the United Nations high commissioner for 
human rights made some of recommendations, 
pointing them, to the end of the impunity of the 
paramilitary forces: 
“urge the Colombian state to effectively 
combat paramilitarism and achieve its 
ultimate dismantling by capturing the trial and 
punishment of those who inspire it, organize it, 
command it, integrate it, support it, and finance 
it, including public employers linked to it” (, 
OIDHACO4, recommendation nº 4. Cap. VIII, 
2000).
All the recommendations were rejected 
by former government of Alvaro Uribe which 
has been involved in a “false demobilization”5, 
where his administration headed by high 
commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo 
fabricated the montage, giving homeless 
people the paramilitary equipment and costume 
to transformed them in false paramilitaries and 
convinced the Colombian society with good 
numbers of demobilized troops (Serrano, 2012). 
Then, because if both governments did 
not follow the recommendations, objections 
and suggestions from nongovernmental 
organizations, and from multilateral 
organizations (In addition of being involved 
in illicit processes), what is or has been the 
motivation of the United States to continue 
facing the war on drugs, if it has been seen that 
4 Office in Colombia of the High Commissioner of the 
United Nations for Human Rights by its initials in Spanish
5 In some paramilitary fronts, such as Cacica la Gaita-
na, Nutibara, Heroes de Granada, Ortega
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this has not generated a 100% of favorability in 
the international community? We will analyze 
this question below.
II. The motivation behind the USA´s 
aid in Colombian internal armed 
conflict.
From an official position in 2016, United 
States through USAID program has a real 
motivation respecting the following:
“Colombia has endured more than 50 years 
of armed conflict, perpetuated by widespread 
illegal drug production and trafficking. Violence, 
instability, and the internal displacement of 
entire communities, plagued the country as 
a result of territorial control by illegal armed 
groups” (p. 1). 
On the other hand, USAID established that 
they are:
 “Committed to Colombia’s development, 
peace, and security; and for that reason, 
the United States launched Plan Colombia 
in 2000. Through Plan Colombia, the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) 
has helped Colombia to promote social and 
economic development, rule of law, human 
rights, reintegration of ex-combatants, support 
to victims and vulnerable populations including 
Afro-Colombians and indigenous communities, 
climate change mitigation, and low-emissions 
development” (USAID, p. 1 2010).
Although the numbers of Colombian Internal 
Armed Conflict still decreasing (as previously 
mentioned), and the United States with the 
intermediation of Plan Colombia, has helped to 
reduce that numbers (according to the previous 
graphics), there is another point of view, which 
suggest other motivations behind  the USA´s aid 
to Colombia during 15 years of Plan Colombia. 
This research takes four hypothesis of that 
motivation, following the line of several authors 
who argue: 
First, inside the Senate of the United States, 
the principal objective of the USA´s aid is the 
economy, and public health. 
One example is the poor results to 
decrease the internal consumption of drug 
and the discharge of responsibilities to the 
illegal cultivation and drug trafficking towards 
countries such as Colombia (Rincon, Correa, 
Leon, 2016). 
Second, maintain the favorable interests 
through its American base world order due 
to the indirect aggravation of inequality and 
poverty in regions such as Latin America, 
using sometimes violence through its military 
expenditure to dissuade the social claims who 
wants to divert its particular social and political 
model (Moreno, 2016).
Third, the armament market is part of the 
American economy. For that reason, the military 
interventions help to sustain the armament 
industry and retain the political and social 
deviations to the United States (Cox, 2014).
The maintenance of status quo is imperative 
for the administration, security and the cost-
effectiveness of investments (Cox, 2014). 
Fourth, the motivation against a specific 
illegal cultivation has taken precedence in the 
US fight in Colombia. Coca cultivation and 
eradication takes one important piece of US 
budget in Colombia´s aid, unlike other illegal 
crops such as marihuana. 
This strategy was built with Colombian 
government support, using glyphosate spraying 
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in crops of cocaine (Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement, 2012). 
According to recent researches of the 
Lancet Commission of Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health (Csete, J. 
et al. 2016), the spraying of glyphosate in coca 
crops has produced public health problems 
in Colombian rural communities nearby the 
cultivations sprayed. 
Therefore, in a previous sentence6, the 
constitutional court of Colombia prohibited the 
glyphosate, arguing “We look for an alternative 
form with another non-toxic chemical, or it is 
carried out under strict controls and minimizing 
the potential negative effects it may have on 
ethnic communities.” (Corte Constitucional, 
2017).
The last verdict made by Colombian 
Constitutional Court had a negative acceptance 
in United States Government and Senate 
because they defend the eradication of coca 
cultivation with glyphosate (Development of this 
topic in chapter three). 
Generally, Plan Colombia had an impact, 
helping Colombian military forces to combat 
against terrorism and illegal cultivation. 
On the other hand, the Plan contributed to the 
social and economic restoration of Colombian 
society (according to official numbers), both 
urban and rural society, framed by violence, 
poverty, and displacement. 
In spite of the fact that, Colombian situation 
about internal conflict seemed unfinished. 
since the announcement of the end of 
the  internal armed conflict between FARC 
(Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces) and 
the Colombian government, in 2012, a new era 
of bilateral cooperation begins and new funds 
6 T sentence 236-17
to carry out the agreement remains imperative 
due to the effort of the Colombian government 
to achieve the peace.
“Peace” Colombia is the new program in 
which the United States bet for maintaining the 
aid for the eradication of illegal crops and drug 
trafficking in Colombia. 
Now, let´s take a look to the process of 
Havana peace agreement and then, the 
acquisition of Peace Colombia program and its 
procedure.
III.   Peace Colombia and the 
bilateral cooperation
Before the analysis of Peace Colombia 
and the new bilateral cooperation between 
Colombia and the United States, is imperative 
to describe the different steps of peace 
agreement of Colombia. 
Once the new president of Colombia was 
elected in 2010, Juan Manuel Santos started 
a secret process of negotiation with FARC 
guerrilla in Havana.
 At the end of the year 2012, both, Colombian 
president and guerrilla leaders announced from 
Norway, the beginning of official negotiation in 
Havana, Cuba (Segura & Mechoulan, 2017).   
During the negotiation, six essential points 
that represented the roots of the internal armed 
conflict were developed between government 
and guerrillas negotiators (Havana Agreement, 
2016):
1. Integral rural reform
2. Political participation
3. End of conflict
4. Solution to the illicit drug problem
5. Victims
6. Implementation, verification, and 
validation
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After four years of negotiation, both corners 
with the approval of the international community 
signed in Havana the agreement to end the 
conflict. 
Afterward, in Cartagena Colombia, the 
official event was made to present to the world 
the end of more than 50 years of violence 
(United Nations, 2017).
The next step was to validate the agreement 
with a plebiscite where Colombians will vote 
yes or no to the implementation. The “no vote”, 
was the winner respond to the agreements and 
the restructuration of peace started to reunite 
Colombian society, alienated in that time. 
Mutually, government and guerrilla had a 
reunion with the opposition to the administration, 
to incorporate the concerns about what was 
agreed (Alto Comisionado para La Paz, 2016).  
The US Congress and administration 
started to reevaluate the aid to Colombia in this 
new stage of bilateral cooperation, according to 
that restructuration.
Peace Colombia is the name of a renovate 
Plan Colombia, in which US government 
assistance will focus under three pillars (Office 
of the Press Secretary, p. 1 2016):
1. Consolidating and expanding progress 
on security and counter narcotics while 
reintegrating the FARC into society 
2. Expanding state presence and 
institutions to strengthen the rule of law 
and rural economies, especially in former 
conflict areas; and 
3. Promoting justice and other essential 
services for conflict victims. 
US Congress approved $391,253,000 
million of dollars and a top of $450 million of 
Dollar, from October 2016 to September 2017, 
divided in:
$187.3 million through the US Economic 
Support Fund; $143 million for International 
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; $38.5 
million in Foreign Military Financing; $21 million 
for Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining 
and Related Programs; and $1.4 million for 
International Military Education and Training 
(Norman, 2017).
Nevertheless, Included in the total are 
commitments of $20 million for Afro-Colombian 
and indigenous communities, $19 million for 
human rights and $4 million for biodiversity 
(Norman, 2017).
On the other hand, the secretary of state 
made some restrictions to certify the plan 
(Norman, p. 1 2017):
1. That the Peace Tribunal and other 
judicial bodies are “independent” 
and can sentence “perpetrators of 
gross violations of human rights … to 
meaningful sanctions;”
2. That military personnel responsible for 
the several thousand “false positive” 
murders, “including those in command 
authority,” are removed from office while 
being prosecuted and sanctioned;
3. The Colombian government works to 
“dismantle illegal armed groups, taking 
effective steps to protect the rights of 
human rights defenders, journalists, 
trade unionists, and other social activists, 
and protecting the rights and territory 
of indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
communities.”
Although the approval of Peace Colombia, 
Trump Administration put the bilateral relations 
in check, after a wake-up call for the increment 
of coca cultivation in Colombia. 
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The Memorandum to the Secretary of State 
remarked on:
“The extraordinary increase in coca 
cultivation and cocaine production in the 
last three years”… and he ends arguing his 
administration “will leave the open option of 
designating Colombia as a failed country in 
the fight against drug trafficking if it does not 
show “significant progress” in reducing coca 
cultivation and cocaine production” (White 
House, p.1 2018).
In contrast, the Colombian government 
surprised due to Trump report, respond through 
its chancellery and other presidential stages: 
“A historical relationship based on success, 
based on trust, cannot be destroyed at any 
moment” and “The authorities of consumer 
countries have a fundamental responsibility 
with their fellow citizens and with the world to 
reduce consumption and attack trafficking 
and distribution organizations in their own 
countries.”(Cosoy; p. 1, 2018).  
Until now, US administration has not taken 
any reprisal and urged to the Colombian 
government to re-use the glyphosate spraying 
to decrease the coca cultivations. 
Peace Colombia is not the only plan to 
face post-conflict in Colombia. International 
cooperation either for States or Non-
governmental organizations has been a support 
for the Colombian government, which has done 
vital efforts to acquire some international aid to 
start the new era of Colombian society. 
In head of the Presidential Agency for 
International Cooperation of Colombia (APC-
Colombia, acronym in Spanish), the fundraising 
has been distributed into two programs: 
First, the program called “Fondo Colombia en 
Paz” (Peace Colombian Fund), where multilateral 
organisms and European Union get involved.
Second, bilateral aid which collects the most 
funds that come from United States, European 
Union, and countries such as Canada, France, 
and Scandinavian (Gomez, Perrone, Ríos, 
2016).
APC (p. 9-10 2016) report suggests the 
amount of fundraising to face the post-conflict. 
The official number averages the 3.3 million of 
Dollars in five years, divided into three areas: 
1. Peace building – 69%.
2. Sustainable rural development – 24%.
3. Conservation and environmental 
sustainability – 3%. 
Thus, Colombia manages some possibilities 
of post-conflict financing, but these aids are not 
sufficient, taking into account that the amount of 
these funds, come from the United States, and 
depends on structured criteria and also a good 
bilateral cooperation between two countries.  
More than fifteen years have passed and 
the bilateral relation between Colombia and 
the United States has had a rollercoaster road, 
where the mutual respect has prevailed, and the 
commitment to move forward the fight against 
illegal cultivation and drug trafficking. 
Nevertheless, some challenges and 
opportunities will appear in the new era of 
bilateral cooperation if there is no change about 
the bilateral form in which both governments 
are facing this next step of Colombian internal 
conflict.
IV. Challenges and opportunities in 
the new era of cooperation between 
Colombia and the United States
Colombia and the United States will face 
in this new era of bilateral cooperation some 
challenges that would cause a modification in 
the development of cooperation between them. 
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For that reason, some of these challenges 
were cited by US Secretary of State in the 
requirements to certify the plan. 
Nonetheless, the challenges are determinant 
in the international arena (international 
cooperation) and sometimes will be match 
up as follows: efficiency of government; non-
completion of a peace agreement by Colombian 
government or FARC guerrilla; mismanagement 
of the eradication of illicit crops; corruption and 
Human Rights.
IV. I Efficiency of government
Undoubtedly, an efficient government is 
essential to carry out the decisions of a nation 
and also, to gear the international relations of 
these nations. 
Colombia, presents a score of 1.9 (where 1 is 
inefficient and 7 is efficient) about the efficiency 
of government in the public sector, according to 
the 2018 survey of the World Economic Forum. 
As a result of this survey, the way in which 
Colombian government is spending the public 
revenues will be the reflection of international 
aid spending in the country.  For that reason, it 
is important to Colombian government to have 
better results in internal public expense.
In the international scenario, trust is an 
important piece to cooperate in diverse fields. 
There are four different forms to evaluate that 
trust (Koch, 2018):
Rational-personal: 
This is a cost-benefit reasoning, in which 
cooperation depends on a rational choice, as 
public health conditions of American citizens, to 
US government. 
Social-cultural understanding:
This is a key point in international trust. 
Having an agenda as clear as possible in terms 
of economic and Democracy, that benefits the 
trust in the international scenario. 
General – personal relationships:
Have a good political and economic 
relationship, regardless of the national 
decisions or interests of each country, always 
with the intention of improving the aspects that 
are considered necessary to obtain a full level 
of democracy.
Historical-institutional relations:
The historical decisions regarding joint 
struggles affected the trust. For that reason, 
during more than twenty years of bilateral 
relation, the United States and Colombia have 
not taken into consideration, that the foreign 
policy of both countries has affected the way in 
which they have wanted to combat the internal 
conflict and its external consequences.
All the last forms to evaluate trust in 
international cooperation make us foresee a 
critical statement: 
Why if conditions on trust are overvalued 
in the cooperation between the two countries, 
an unequivocal relationship is still posed, with 
policies that do not take into account socio-
political traditions, or the conditions to carry 
them out, or the way in which the Colombian 
government carries out the public policies 
referring to the internal conflict.
The above refers to the fact that Colombia 
has presented a very low rating in terms of 
efficiency in public spending and in its tradition 
of corruption in its public institutions throughout 
the internal conflict.
 As a consequence, why haven´t they sought 
an alternative joint policy to solve a dilemma 
that, despite the existence of an agreement 
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between the Colombian government and the 
FARC, it is not clear how Colombia and its allies 
will reconsider the post-conflict that will be more 
difficult than the conflict itself? 
Thus, this challenge is presented as 
fundamental when it comes to managing the 
next stage of bilateral relations between both 
countries.
IV.II Non-completion of the 
peace agreement by Colombian 
government or FARC guerrilla
Until now, both the Colombian government 
and FARC guerrilla have respected the historical 
agreement. The delivery of weapons to United 
Nations, the birth of Special Justice for Peace, 
the creation of the new political movement of 
old FARC guerrilla (revolutionary alternative 
force of the common) are the important steps of 
Teatro Colón Agreement. 
However, an emergent phenomenon has 
started since the sign of the Agreement: The 
presence of FARC dissidents in the Colombian 
borderline with Ecuador and Venezuela. Official 
data estimates that there are more than 1200 
dissidents that will become in a threat to the 
peace stability (Fundación Ideas para La Paz, 
2018).  
This is or would be one of the most important 
challenges in Colombian post-conflict and 
also in the new stage of bilateral relation with 
the United States, in the way in which Trump 
administration will not want that Colombia 
does not comply what was agreed in the 
peace Colombia plan, where the government 
committed to abide what was agreed in 
Havana, in addition to the demands of the US 
government to support peace in the nation.
The demands of the United States 
government are not jeopardize what was 
achieved because:
“emboldened organized criminal groups and 
huge inflows of illicit earnings will erode citizen 
security, increase corruption, foment increased 
illegal immigration, and destabilize neighboring 
states and Colombia itself, thus undermining 
the legacy and legitimacy of the peace accord” 
(Brownfield, p.1 2017). 
IV.III Mismanagement of the 
eradication of illicit crops
The challenge of managing the eradication 
of illicit crops is one of the precautions of 
United States administration in Colombian 
post-conflict. As was stated previously, US 
administration leading by Donald Trump, 
criticize the way in which Colombia was carried 
out the eradication of illicit crops such as coca 
cultivation. 
According to the point four of Teatro Colón 
Agreement, the solution to the illicit drug 
problem, will be treated in several approaches, 
as High Councilor of Peace argued (Oficina Del 
Alto Comisionado para La Paz, 2016): 
First, rural development approach: 
“Creation of the National Integral Program 
of Substitution and Alternative Development 
of the hand of the communities affected by the 
crops and with the national, departmental and 
local authorities”. 
“The program will be developed with the 
active participation of the communities that 
will play a role in the design, execution, and 
monitoring of its implementation. P.1”
Second, the fight against organized crime 
and drug trafficking approach: 
“Creation of a comprehensive strategy to 
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dismantle and prosecute, in a targeted manner, 
drug trafficking networks in the territory, 
strengthen the fight against money laundering 
in all sectors of the economy and establish 
strict controls on the production and trafficking 
of inputs for the production of narcotics and, 
proposing new actions to combat corruption 
associated with drug trafficking” P.1
Third, consumption with a public health 
approach: 
“It will be addressed with a focus on human 
rights and public health. State institutions 
will be articulated and a process will be 
coordinated with communities and families to 
carry out rehabilitation and consumer insertion 
actions”P.1
This is a challenge that won´t be evaluated 
rapidly because, is required a political 
and social transition, as well as a constant 
effort to implement the point four of Teatro 
Colón Agreement in the communities most 
disadvantaged and affected by illicit cultivation.
Besides, Trump administration believes in 
the sprinkling with glyphosate, as the best form 
to eradicate illicit crops, and it seems that new 
administration leading by Duque is specifying 
to return to the technique presented by US 
administration.
IV.IV Corruption
With certainty, corruption will be a 
menace to the post-conflict in Colombia. The 
implementation of the Teatro Colón Agreement 
and the international aid to carry it out are 
threatened by the mismanagement of financing. 
The most affected by corruption are the peace 
territories7 and according to “Transparencia por 
Colombia” (2016): 
7 Territorios antiguamente dominados por las FARC y 
abandonados por el Estado Colombiano
First, between 2010 and 2016, 187 
verified corruption facts were identified in 
the 17 departments, which host 69 peace 
municipalities (27 zones) and 58 consolidation 
municipalities.
Second, 7 departments account for 63% of 
corruption events: La Guajira, Valle del Cauca, 
Nariño, Chocó, Antioquia, Bolívar and Cesar.
Third, Nariño, La Guajira, and Valle Del 
Cauca presented the biggest events of 
corruption (30%) followed by Antioquia and 
Chocó (18%).
Fourth, Municipalities such as Tumaco, 
El Bagre, Nechí, San José del Guaviare 
and Arauca, concentrate 20% of the acts of 
corruption of the territories of peace. 
On the other hand, the most affected areas 
by corruption are: 
Source: personal elaboration based on data by Transparencia 
por Colombia, 2016
Analyzing the previous data, it seems that 
corruption has been one of the most important 
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fights of the Colombian government in last 
decades. 
Therefore, since the sign of peace 
agreement, the administration has called to face 
this massive challenge that afflicts Colombian 
society, strengthening the institutionality in all 
the municipalities, and involving the citizens to 
participate in social decisions, as the Minister 
Counselor for the Post-Conflict Oscar Naranjo 
expressed:
“Only through the strengthening of 
institutionality at the national, regional and 
local levels, added to an active model of citizen 
participation, will it be possible to have a post-
conflict” (Semana, p.1 2015). 
For that reason, corruption is a real challenge 
to accomplish the peace agreement, taking into 
account that the public funds must be coopted 
by public functionaries and State contractors, 
which would distort the international aid, an 
also  will generates a malaise to the Trump 
administration.  
IV.V Human Rights
Historically, since the Colombian internal 
armed conflict started, the violation of human 
rights has been a persistent issue. 
Human Rights Watch expresses in an 
academic way the situation of Colombia since 
2002 (p.1):
“Colombia’s civilian population continues 
to be the victim of serious abuses committed 
by guerrillas and successor groups of 
paramilitaries, which emerged after an official 
paramilitary demobilization process, carried out 
a decade ago”. 
Also argues, “The violence associated with 
the internal armed conflict in Colombia has led 
to the forced displacement of more than 5.7 
million Colombians, and each year more than 
200,000 new people leave their homes, which 
has generated the world’s second largest 
population of internally displaced persons”.
In addition, “It is common for human 
rights defenders, trade unionists, journalists, 
indigenous and Afro-Colombian leaders, and 
other community activists to face death threats 
and other types of violence. Although the 
government of President Juan Manuel Santos 
has systematically repudiated these attacks, 
the lack of results of the investigations implies 
that there are very few cases in which those 
responsible are arrested”.
Unquestionably, Human rights are part of 
the materialization of peace in Colombia and 
depends on the ability of the government to 
deal with this topic, thus, peace will be reached 
by Colombian society. 
There is an academic Hypothesis by Cortez 
2016, which public policies, regarding the 
development of peace, are capable to recover 
human rights lost by time of violence or internal 
conflict. 
It means that, government must turn its 
efforts to work in the restoration of human dignity 
and human and socioeconomic development, 
all involve inside in a rights approach: 
“This approach allows us to go beyond 
identifying human rights with the internal armed 
conflict and violations, to a broader view that 
conceives them from the human aspiration to 
have their basic needs met in conditions proper 
to human dignity” (Cortés, p. 143 2016).
The United States has claimed since started 
the bilateral relation with Colombia, to urge the 
government, to act systematically about the 
violations of population´s rights.
For that reason,  this issue is the most 
controversial in terms of the internal conflict 
in Colombia, as the efforts made by the 
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government and its international allies to 
create an effective security system for citizens 
and their leaders, journalists, judges, and the 
public forces has not ended the homicides 
and persecutions towards these actors of the 
conflict.   
However, in the second instance, 
opportunities join in the challenges to play 
a role in international cooperation because 
opportunities depend on the way in which 
challenges will be confronted according to 
some dynamics that made a structure of 
political opportunity strong or weak. 
In political science, and as Tarrow quote 
in 1997, a structure of political opportunity is 
referred to some external or existing dimensions 
(not necessary formals, permanents or national) 
of political environment that encourage or 
discourage the collective action among people. 
The above assumes that the theory of 
the structure of political opportunity (SPO) 
discussed in the present analysis entails to 
a ramification of political science known as 
social movements which study the features of 
mobilization of people according to a collective 
objective. 
Nonetheless, the present research seeks 
to analyze the structure of political opportunity 
from the point of view of the opportunities 
in international cooperation and bilateral 
cooperation of Colombia in its new era referred 
to the post-conflict. 
Now, to analyze this structure of political 
opportunity is crucial to use the matrix of 
multidimensional SPO. This matrix includes as 
categories: SPO systematic, SPO relational, 
SPO international. On the other side, contain 
the emergent opportunity and the emergent 
threat. The following graph presents the SPO 
matrix:
According to Tarrow (1997), the majority 
of the categories approved in emergent 
opportunity means that it is considered an ideal 
chance to carry out a social mobilization. 
Nevertheless, in this analysis, the chance is 
referred to a growing opportunity to establish 
an international cooperation or bilateral 
cooperation because:
First, there is an opening of the government 
in Colombia. It means the opportunity that all the 
international actors’ looks in a different way the 
commitment of Colombia to enhance the post-
conflict and thus, everyone in the international 
scenario possibly will the chance to cooperate 
with Colombia.
Second, there is solidarity in political terms, 
from elite. It is understood as a coherence 
of the elite (no divisions), determinant to the 
interaction with the international actors (making 
the proviso that this could change if the 
polarization becomes more intrinsic in the most 
important decisions of the country).
Third, there are new allies in the political 
system, available for starting new international 
cooperation.
Fourth, there is an increment of facilitation, 
instead of repression from elites, allies, and 
Th
e U
nit
ed
 S
ta
te
s i
nt
er
na
tio
na
l a
id
 to
 th
e n
ew
 st
ag
e o
f C
olo
mb
ia:
 
a n
ew
 er
a f
or
 bi
lat
er
al 
an
d i
nt
er
na
tio
na
l c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n
Revista Internacional de Cooperación y Desarrollo Vol. 5 No. 2 | Año 2018 | pág: 262-281
279
society which contributed to an international 
cooperation.
As a result, there is a step to change in 
which the emergent opportunity to maintain 
and acquire international cooperation to the 
post-conflict. 
An example of the above, is the commitment 
from Colombian government to do transparently 
the peace agreement (with international 
support), and pass the difficult exam to be part 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), as president 
Santos claims in Paris, after the signing of the 
agreement of accession to this multilateral 
organization: 
“Entering the OECD is going to be of great 
help for Colombia to continue advancing, 
continue to reduce poverty, so that even more 
investment arrives and to guarantee a more just, 
more inclusive, and sustainable development.” 
(Presidencia de la Republica, 2:45, 2018).
Notwithstanding, the structure of 
opportunities can disappear if the new 
government does not face the challenges 
mentioned above with an alternative approach 
that has been worked on; if it does not improve 
the negative numbers in terms of human rights, 
institutional transparency, and security, which 
are evaluated internationally.
V. Conclusion
More than fifteen years of bilateral 
cooperation between Colombia and the United 
States made a strong relationship which has 
had a rollercoaster road, with opportunities and 
challenges. 
Although the US aid has not had one 
hundred percent of echo in the development of 
human rights, corruption, the total eradication 
of illicit crops and in the socioeconomic sphere 
of Colombia (according to the first chapter of 
the article), the bilateral cooperation remains 
the same and US administration is committed 
to helping Colombian society with the new post-
conflict scenario.
In addition, this commitment was reflected in 
the decision of US Congress and administration 
to increase the aid funds to Colombia through 
the Peace Colombia Plan, producing a new era 
of bilateral cooperation between both countries 
who hold one of the best political relationships 
in the western hemisphere.
It is known that the post-conflict era in 
Colombia presents some challenges such as, 
the efficiency of the Colombian government, the 
possible non-completion of peace agreement, 
and the eradication of illicit crops, corruption, 
and Human Rights violation.
Besides, some opportunities as opening 
regime, coherence of elite, stability of political 
alignments, more facilitation from elites, 
allies and society which contributed to a wide 
spectrum of international cooperation to face 
the post-conflict era. 
However, the opportunities will face a 
change of direction if the new government does 
not begin to reflect on how the fight against the 
internal conflict has been carried out, and if this 
has been truly effective in its process. 
On the other hand, we must reflect on 
whether the help of strategic allies such as the 
United States has been effective, especially 
in the fight against drug trafficking and illicit 
cultivation, because in 20 years of cooperation 
some numbers have been reduced, but the 
root of the problem continues to grow, harming 
Colombian´s citizens of the periphery.
As a consequence of that, the contribution 
of the present article is to search an alternative 
policy carried out by both countries, where the 
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security and well-being of the Colombian people 
come first, to the Colombian government and 
also the North American government’s interest.
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